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Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 1 (Jan. 17, 2008) 
Civil Procedure – Motion for New Trial for Attorney Misconduct 
Summary 
 
 This is an en banc rehearing of Lioce v. Cohen.1  This case involves the consolidated 
appeals of four district court orders, two granting new trials because of attorney misconduct and 
two denying new trials because of attorney misconduct. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by ordering two 
new trials because on attorney misconduct.  The Court also vacated the District Court’s denials 
of motions for new trial because of attorney misconduct and remanded the cases for new 
decisions consistent with the standards in the opinion. 
 
 The Court previously remanded two cases to calculate monetary sanctions for the 
attorney guilty of misconduct, but on rehearing declined to impose monetary sanctions instead 
referring the attorney to the Nevada State Bar. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 The four consolidated appeals in this case are grouped together because all four 
defendants shared the same defense attorney, Phillip Emerson.  The four cases were all personal 
injury proceedings and Mr. Emerson gave a similar closing argument in each case.  The motions 
for a new trial because of attorney misconduct are based on the statements made in these closing 
arguments. 
 
 Mr. Emerson’s closing arguments all contained similar arguments and statements 
reflecting his personal views on the cases and how the jury should decide the matters.  In each 
proceeding, Mr. Emerson called the lawsuits frivolous and wastes of the taxpayers money.  He 
further stated that lawsuits of this vein gave the legal profession and the American justice system 
a bad reputation.  Mr. Emerson also gave his personal reasons for participating in cases such as 
these which included his personal mission to improve the public’s view of the legal profession 
and to fight those who bring frivolous personal injury lawsuits. 
 
 The substance of the closing arguments was basically the same but the plaintiffs’ counsel 
in each proceeding reacted differently.   
 
 In Castro v. Cabrera, the Cabreras’ attorney did not object to Mr. Emerson’s closing 
argument.  The jury found in Castro’s favor and the Cabreras moved for a new trial on the basis 
that Mr. Emerson’s closing argument amounted to attorney misconduct.  The District Court 
found that Mr. Emerson’s closing argument constituted attorney misconduct and further found 
                                                            
1 Lioce v. Cohen, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 115, 149 P.3d 916 (2006). 
that it permeated the entire proceeding which called for a new trial.  Castro appealed the 
decision. 
 
 In Lioce v. Cohen, Lioce’s attorney did not object to Mr. Emerson’s closing argument.  
After a verdict in favor of the defendant, Lioce moved for a directed verdict or a new trial 
because of attorney misconduct.  The District Court denied both motions without stating its 
reasons or reporting the hearing on the motions.  
 
 In Lang v. Knippenberg, Mr. Emerson made the same closing argument, but the Langs 
objected multiple times throughout the discourse.  The District Court sustained each objection 
but did not admonish Mr. Emerson for his conduct.  After the closing argument, the Langs 
moved for a mistrial based on Mr. Emerson’s closing argument which was denied because the 
objections to the closing argument had been sustained.  After a jury verdict in favor of the 
defendant, the Langs moved for a new trial because of attorney misconduct but the District Court 
denied the motion.  The District Court’s reason for denial was that the attorney misconduct did 
not permeate the entire trial to an extent that a new trial would be warranted. 
 
 In Seasholtz v. Wheeler, Seasholtz stipulated liability for an auto accident and even so, 
Mr. Emerson gave the same closing argument.  Wheeler’s attorney did not object to Mr. 
Emerson’s closing argument.  After the jury found in favor of the defendant, Wheeler moved for 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial because of attorney misconduct.  The 
District Court granted a new trial despite the lack of objection because it found that Mr. 
Emerson’s closing argument amounted to attorney misconduct which was of such sinister 
influence that it constituted irreparable error.    
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court consolidated the four appeals that resulted from the 
foregoing cases and heard them in Lioce v. Cohen.2  The Court revised the standards under 
which District Courts are to evaluate motions for new trials because of attorney misconduct.  I
then reversed the denials of new trials in Lioce and Cohen and remanded the cases to the Dist
Court for further consideration consistent with the Court’s opinion.  The Court also affirmed the 
grants of new trials in Castro and Seasholtz and made the determination that Mr. Emerson’s 
conduct in those cases amounted to attorney misconduct and should be evaluated for monetary 
sanctions.  The Court also referred Mr. Emerson to the Nevada State Bar for disciplinary 
proceeding. 
t 
rict 
 
Discussion 
 
A. Prior Attorney Misconduct Jurisprudence 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court first evaluated attorney misconduct in Barrett v. Baird.3  The  
Court stated that “[t]o warrant a new trial on grounds of attorney misconduct, the flavor of 
misconduct must sufficiently permeate an entire proceeding to provide conviction that the jury 
was influenced by passion and prejudice in reaching its verdict.”4    Because the Nevada 
                                                            
2 Lioce v. Cohen, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 115, 149 P.3d 916 (2006). 
3 Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496 (1995) 
4 Id. at 1515. 
Supreme Court never addressed the issue of objections to attorney misconduct, the Barrett rule 
implicitly applied to both objected-to and unobjected-to misconduct. 
 
 The next Nevada Supreme Court case addressing attorney misconduct is DeJesus v. 
Flick.5  The issue on appeal was whether a party’s failure to object to improper argument during 
trial foreclosed that party from raising the issue in the context of an appeal from an order 
denying a new trial with Barrett being the standard for the attorney’s unobjected-to misconduct.6  
The majority recognized the general rule that states a failure to object to attorney misconduct 
precludes review.7  However, it also held that an exception to the general rule should apply to 
prevent plain error that results from the “inflammatory quality and sheer quantity of misconduct” 
by the opposing party’s attorney.8  The DeJesus majority holding created a rule that unobjected 
to misconduct would only be reviewed to see if the exception applies. 
 
 The DeJesus dissent argued for a different standard than that used by the majority.  This 
proposed rule would be that claims of attorney misconduct are generally entitled to no 
consideration unless a timely and proper objection and a request for admonishment has been 
made.9  This rule would prevent unnecessary appellate review by allowing the trial court to make 
a ruling on the matter, but the dissent did recognize that the majority rule may be necessary in 
some extreme cases.10 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court once again evaluated its standards on unobjected-to 
misconduct in Ringle v. Bruton.11  The Court stated that counsel must timely and specifically 
object to instances of improper argument in order to preserve the issue for appeal.12  The Court 
held that it would only consider “egregious but unobjected-to misconduct…only in those rare 
circumstances where the comments are of such sinister influence as to constitute irreparable and 
fundamental error.”13  This plain error rule means that the “irreparable and fundamental error” 
must be such that, if left uncorrected, “would result in a substantial miscarriage of justice or 
denial of fundamental rights.”14 
 
 The Court concluded its historical analysis by stating that the Ringle Court’s reliance on 
DeJesus for its plain error rule was improper and that this rule was misapplied in that case.  The 
Court further announced that the Barrett permeation rule is incomplete and the DeJesus 
“inflammatory quality and sheer quantity” test is unworkable.  It also limits the Ringle plain error 
test to situations where there is no other reasonable explanation for the verdict except for 
misconduct. 
 
                                                            
5 DeJesus v. Flick, 116 Nev. 812 (2000) (plurality opinion) 
6 Id. at 815-16. 
7 Id. at 816. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 826 (Rose, C.J., dissenting) 
10 Id. at 826-27. 
11 Ringle v. Bruton, 120 Nev. 82 (2004). 
12 Id. at 95. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
B. New Standards for Evaluating Attorney Misconduct 
 
 The Court followed its historical analysis of attorney misconduct standards by clarifying 
what the standards will be from this case forth.  It began by stating that the Barrett rule for 
objected-to misconduct dopes not sufficiently consider and apply the salutary purposes of 
objection and for that reason is explicitly overruled.  The language in Barrett that states a new 
trial is proper when attorney misconduct sufficiently permeates the proceedings remains good 
law. 
 
1. Objected-to and Admonished Attorney Misconduct 
 
 The Court decided that the standard articulated in DeJesus’ dissenting opinion is the 
correct rule for evaluating objected-to and admonished misconduct.  In the case of objected-to 
and admonished misconduct, a party moving for a new trial bears the burden of showing that the 
misconduct is so extreme that the objection and admonishment could not remove the 
misconduct’s effect.  When the district court finds that is the case then a new trial is warranted. 
 
2. Objected-to but not admonished Attorney Misconduct 
 
 In the case where the district court overrules an objection to purported attorney 
misconduct and does not admonish the jury, the party moving for a new trial must first 
demonstrate that the district court erred in overruling the party’s objection.  If the district court 
concludes that the objection to attorney misconduct should have been sustained, then the district 
court must determine whether an admonition to the jury would likely have affected the verdict in 
favor of the moving party.  The Court must evaluate both the evidence and the parties’ and 
attorneys’ demeanor to determine whether a party’s substantial rights were affected by the 
court’s failure to sustain the objection and admonish the jury.  If this is so then a new trial 
because of attorney misconduct is warranted. 
 
3. Repeated or Continued Objected-to but not admonished Attorney Misconduct 
 
 The Court noted that when an attorney must continuously object to repeated or persistent 
misconduct, the non-offending attorney is placed in a dilemma of having to make repeated 
objections before the trier of fact, which may cast a negative impression on the attorney and 
represented party, which in turn emphasizes the incorrect point.  The Court’s standard for these 
situations is that when the district court decides a motion for a new trial based on repeated 
objected-to misconduct, the district court shall factor into the analysis that the attorney has 
accepted the risk that the jury will be influenced by his misconduct by engaging in persistent 
attorney misconduct.  The Court demands that great weight be given to the fact that single 
instances of improper attorney conduct that could have been cured by objection and 
admonishment may be incurable when that conduct is repeated. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Unobjected-to Attorney Misconduct 
 
 The Court restates the rule in Ringle that a party must object to purportedly improper 
argument to preserve the issue for appeal.15  However, in cases of plain error, the courts may still 
review allegations of unobjected-to attorney misconduct.  As stated in Ringle, the party who 
moves for a new trial based on unobjected-to attorney misconduct must show that no other 
reasonable explanation for the verdict exists.  The standard remains the district court must find 
“irreparable and fundamental error” that, if left uncorrected, “would result in a substantial 
miscarriage of justice or denial of fundamental rights.” 
 
5. Mr. Emerson’s Alleged Attorney Misconduct 
 
 The Court found that each of Mr. Emerson’s closing arguments constituted attorney 
misconduct.  The arguments fell into three categories of misconduct: (1) jury nullification; (2) 
statements of personal opinion; and (3) golden rule arguments.  Each of these types of argument 
utilized by Mr. Emerson was improper. 
 
6. Disposition of the Appeals 
 
 The final task for the court was to determine whether the district court erred in its 
decisions on the motions for new trials. 
 
 In the Castro case, the Court upheld the grant of a new trial based on attorney misconduct 
even though the Cabreras’ attorney did not object to the misconduct and district court applied the 
Barrett “sufficiently permeated the proceedings” standard.  The district court found that Mr. 
Emerson’s arguments constituted repeated attorney misconduct egregious enough to warrant a 
new trial and the Court upheld its order for a new trial. 
 
 In Seasholtz, the district court found that Mr. Emerson’s argument amounted to 
irreparable and fundamental error and granted the motion for a new trial.  The Court upheld the 
district court’s order even though it used the improper standard. 
 
 In Lang, the Court found that the district court improperly applied the Barrett and 
DeJesus standards when deciding the Langs’ motion for a new trial based on attorney 
misconduct.  The Court vacated the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial and 
remanded it to the district court to apply the correct standards. 
 
 In Lioce, the district court did not provide any reasoning for it denial of the motion for a 
new trial based on attorney misconduct.  The Court concluded that it could not evaluate the 
district court’s decision so it vacated the order and remanded the matter for further consideration 
consistent with the new standards. 
 
 
 
                                                            
15 Ringle, 120 Nev. at 95. 
7. Sanctions for Mr. Emerson 
 
 In the Court’s opinion prior to rehearing, it imposed sanctions on Mr. Emerson for his 
conduct in the Castro and Seasholt cases.  The Court now declines to impose sanctions on Mr. 
Emerson as such decisions are best left to the discretion of the district court.  The Court referred 
Mr. Emerson to the Nevada State Bar for an investigation of potential violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
 
Dissenting/Concurring Opinions 
 
 Justice Parraguirre wrote an opinion concurring in part with the majority’s analysis of the 
standards for attorney misconduct and the refusal to impose monetary sanctions on Mr. Emerson 
and dissenting in part with the decision to refer Mr. Emerson to the Nevada State Bar.  Justice 
Parraguirre would decline to refer Mr. Emerson to the Nevada State Bar without a finding of 
appellate abuse.  Justice Maupin joins in Justice Parraguirre’s opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In the four consolidated appeals heard in Lioce v. Cohen, the Court revised its standards 
for attorney misconduct jurisprudence.  The Court further required that district court’s make 
specific finding on the record and in their orders regarding these standards.  The orders granting 
new trials based on attorney misconduct in Castro and Seasholtz are affirmed.  The orders 
denying motions for new trials in Lang and Lioce are vacated and remanded to the district courts 
for decisions consistent with the standards set forth in this opinion. 
